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FOREWORD
Study 2. 1, Manned Systems Utilization Analysis, is a con-
tinuation of previous efforts directed at investigating new operational con-
cepts for future space applications. This particular effort addresses the
potential improvement in operational effectiveness that could be achieved
by active manned maintenance of scientific instruments. Skylab/ATM
',Apollo Telescope Mount) experience is employed as an historical founda-
tion for what can be accomplished even when the instruments have not been
designed for maintenance.
Although the principal interest has been devoted to man's
role in the area of maintenance, there have been additional subtask efforts
performed in response to direction from the NASA Technical Monitor. These
subtasks have not been addressed in this summary report but have been docu-
mented and are listed below for reference purposes.
Space Servicing Pilot Program Study, ATR-75(7361)-1
Final Reports:
Volume I:	 Executive Summary, ATR-76(7361)-1, Vol I
Volume II:	 Manned Systems Utilization, ATR-76(7361)- 1, Vol II
Volume III:	 LOVES Computer Simulations, Results and Analyses,
ATR-76(7361)-1, Vol III
Volume IV:	 Program Manual and Users Guide for the LOVES
Computer Code, ATR-76(7361)-1, Vol IV (formerly
ATR-74(7341)-61,
Volume V:	 Program, Listing for the LOVES Computer Code,
ATR-76(7361)-1, Vol V (formerly ATR-74(7341)-7)
The Technical Monitor of this 12-month effort was
Mr. V. N. Huff, Code MT, at NASA Headquarters. Upon Mr. Huff's
retirement in May 1975, the technical responsibility for Study 2. 1 was
assigned to Dr. J. W. Steincamp, Code PD 34, MSFC.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Aerospace Corporation, under contract to NASA
Headquarters, Office of Manned Space Flight, has continued to address
new concepts that might enhance future space operations. The basic
intent, in all cases, has been to examine various options that could reduce
future expenditures without sacrificing scientific objectives. This drive
toward improved efficiency of operations has continued to be a major moti-
vation for assessing new system concepts, and serves to emphasize the
benefits of these new systems relative to the integrated space program
planning efforts.
The Skylab/ATM (Apollo Telescope Mount) experience has
shown that active manned support, at least for complex scientific instru-
ments, is vital for the achievement of mission objectives. Had this support
not been available, many of the ATM instruments would have fallen far
short of their scientific objectives. This does not imply poor design, inade-
quate testing, or improper training, but merely reflects the inherent nature
of extending the frontiers of scientific achievements.
Manned maintenance, with proper spares provisioning and
a few basic tools, can provide that unique element that assures a high level
of success for scientific missions. Arguments in the past in support r,f
this position have been primarily subjective in nature with little experience
for a foundation. The Skylab Program has changed this, and now thoughts
are directed at the preferred level of interaction and methods to quantify
these benefits relative to future space program options. This is the basis
for Study 2. 1, Manned Systems Utilization Analysis.
1-1
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2. STUDY OBJECTIVES
The principal objective L f this study is to develop basic
data that demonstrates man's contribution to the achievement of scientific
mission objectives. Emphasis has been placed on scientific missions, as
opposed to routine operation of subsystem equipments, because of their
unique character and relatively high potential for increased achievement.
Historically speaking, one of man's principal roles has been the advance-
ment and application of scientific achievement. This should also be true
of his role in space, thus the need to quantify these benefits and to examine
the basic character of the operations required to sustain these benefits.
The Skylab/ ATM Program serves as the foundation for this effort; therefore,
•	 the emphasis is on experience.
The second objective is to examine, in a theoretical sense,
what could be expected in future applications of scientific instruments rela-
tive to the need for interactive manned support operations. This objective
addresses the design impact, the inherent reliability characteristics, and
the relative improvement in system availability that could be achieved by
maintenance or repair actions. Tradeoffs can then be made to assess the
viability of manned support versus alternative measures for achieving a high
level of mission success.
2-1
3. STUDY APPROACH
The tasks performed in this study have been directed along
two parallel complimentary paths. The first path researches the experience
of various correlatable space programs and develops empirical techniques
to associate the benefits of repair and management actions. The actions
taken during the course of these programs are then examined in detail to
establish man's contribution, either remotely or by active participation,
to the task of achieving the original mission objectives. The results are
then related to the possible further enhancement th-A could have 0een
achieved had the instrument been designed for space maintenance.
The alternate path addresses the design features in terms of
weight, volume, and reliability associated with designing for space mainte-
nance. This is achieved by reconfiguring the 5-056 X-ray telescope for
maintenance, and using this data to extrapolate to other ATM experiments.
The estimated reliability characteristics are then examined to determine
the benefits of repair operations, as well as, when redundancy versus
repair should, in general, be employed.
The foundation for the research into anomalous occurrences
was developed by examining the historical results of three similar experi-
ment programs. These were the OVI series of automated spacecraft devel-
oped by the USAF SAMSO organization, the OSO-7 automated spacecraft
developed by NASA, GSFC, and the Skylab 5-056 X-ray telescope experiment
in the ATM. The basic characteristics of each of these is given in Figure 3-1.
Each program is similar in its objectives and represents increasing levels
of complexity to accomplish the mission objectives. Each program has, as
its basic objective, the gathering of solar X-ray spectral data. Each pro-
gram had unique failure modes and in every case, to some degree, failed
to accomplish the total mission objectives. The three programs also repre-
sent increasing levels of cost to obtain the desired scientific data.
3-1
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After evaluating these three experiments, it was found
desirable to expand the effort to include the remaining ATM experiments
in the historical search for anomalous actions. Although not X-ray in3tru-
ments, they were in all cases solar experiments representing the state of
the art at the time, and having similarities in equipment design.
3-3
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4. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The S-056 X-ray Telescope shown in Figure 4-1, is con-
sidered to be reasonably representative of the type of instrument employed
for scientific observations. Alignments are critical, and thermal balance
is essential. The instrument relies on the ATM for power, stabilization,
and other support functions. In the current configuration, access is limited
to removal and replacement of film cassettes, and to the ATM solar shield
door mechanisms. All other elements are contained within the ATM canis-
ter and are inaccessible. The weight budget was established at 161 kg (354
lbs); however, the actual weight was determined to be 133 kg (294 lbs).
The areas of interest, from a maintenance standpoint, are
the camera mechanisms, the camera and thermal control system elect:on-
ics, and the X-ray event analyzer (X-REA). The camera (shown in
Figure 4-2) consists of shutter and filter wheels with stepping motors to
drive them, a film drive mechanism, airlock door mechanism, and a data
block to record reference data on the film. The camera electronics assem-
bly is similar to the X-REA assembly and contains six power supplies,
control circuitry, and the logic circuits to operate in several different
modes. The X-REA (as shown in Figure 4-3) has two proportional counters,
four power supplies, aperture control mechanisms, and various control and
logic circuits. The only redundancy is limited to the thermal control
system electronics.
There are over 500 single point failures in the input and
output stages of the various power supplies alone. The loss of any one
power supply will, as a minimum, rest-it in a severe loss of data. In the
majority of cases, complete loss of mission will occur. There are also
numerous other single point failure situations (stepping motors, logic circuits,
etc. ) that would produce a similar result.
Redesign of the 5-056 assumes accessibilit , r to the subassem-
blies of interest. The basic procedure is to redesign latches and connectors
to allow removal of the three subassemblies of interest to the Skylab pres-
4-1
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surized compartment. An examination of design details indicates that
commonality exists among the various components within these subassem-
blies, and that replacement operations are relatively simple. Therefore,
a failed component (stepper motor, printed circuit board, etc. ) could be
replaced without difficulty and the subassembly reinstalled cn the telescope.
The weight penalty for redesign of latches and connectors was estimated to
be 9 kg (20 lbs), or approximately 7 percent. This value will be employed
later in tradeoffs with redundancy of components.
Reliability information on the S-056 is limited to power
supplies and a few active electronic circuits. However, it is possible,
through experience with other sensor systems, to estimate the overall
system reliability based upon typical equipment failure rates. As mentioned
previously, redundancy is limited to the thermal control system, consequently
this item has been removed from consideration, and all remaining components
treated in a single string manner.
In summary, based upon available information, the probability
that the entire S-056 experiment will operate successfully for the defined
112-day mission has been estimated to be approximately 22 percent. This
is not inconsistent with other space programs of similar design and therefore
can be accepted as a representative value. Consideration of this level of
reliability emphasizes the benefits associated with the repair actions per-
formed by the crew in that it can be reasonably anticipated that data acquisi-
tion would have been severely curtailed without their assistance. However,
the estimated reliability characteristics have a more important application
in developing the desired level of on-orbit repair as discussed in Section 6.
4-5
5. MAINTENANCE ASSESSMENT
The basis for evaluating manned maintenance capabilities
is a comparison of the three representative space-based experiments as
described in Section 3. The three experiments riffer widely in the degree
of operational maintenance that can be performed, but are very similar in
function and purpose. In this way, common criteria could be developed
for assessing the relative improvement in mission success as a function
of maintenance actions. This criteria was based upon two fundamental
parameters, an estimate of the relative design complexity, and the mainte-
nance effectiveness that was, or could have been, performed. Although the
development of this criteria is arbitrary, the various parameters employed
are sufficiently objective to provide a consistent means of comparing instru-
ments and evaluating performance.
The design complexity factor relates to such parameters
as number of operating modes, number of major subsystems or components,
and the degree that operational sequences are automated. The maintenance
effectiveness factor relates to the degree that the instrument performed
over the period of interest, incorporating repair actions as necessary to
achieve mission objectives. In a simplified sense, this represents the
effectiveness with which the desired quality and quantity of scientific data
is obtained. It is, therefore, judged that increased complexity can be
tolerated if the effectiveness of maintaining the instrument shows a like
or better improvement. The final assessment is derived by considering
a value function that relates the effectiveness of gathering data to the cost
of the instrument involved. In effect, the increased cost of relatively com-
plex instruments can only be rationalized if a substantial improvement in
data acquisition is realized.
This effort required extensive research into the instrument
characteristics, as well as, to anomalies that occurred in operation. On
initial contact, most Principal Investigators felt they obtained more than
5-1
adequate data from the experiment of interest. However, in each case,
failures did occur, and a loss of some data did result. Consequently,
although compromises may have been acceptable in practice, the initial
mission objectives were not achieved. There 'ore, the results presented
here represent relative trends rather than upper bounds on the value of
maintenance. Further repair action might have been possible (if it had
been required), but to the extent repair action did occur, it is represented
in the comparison shown in Figure 5-1. Repair action, in this context, can
be either by remote command or by a crewman in space. In either case, it
represents a conscious effort to correct some unplanned anomalous
occurrence.
There is a region of exclusion shown in Figure 5-1, indicat-
iag early failure conditions. If, for instance, a failure occurs and mainte-
nance could not be performed, it would lie in this region. As maintenance
actions are employed, the point of reference will rise representing the
e:fectiveness of the maintenance that was performed. No maintenance
action was possible or the OV1-17 payload; consequently, it falls within
this zone of exclusion. If repair actions could not have been performed on
the remaining instruments, they also would remain in this same zone.
However, repair was performed a:.d the relative effective-
ness is shown for the three reference payloads of interest, the OV1-10,
OSO-7, and the S-056. The OV1-10 had a telemetry sequence interference
problem that was compensated for by altering uplink commands. The OSO-7
was oriented incorrectly and only partial data was obtained. Through a ser-
ies of command actions, it was possible to correct this, to a large extent,
providing a substantial improvement in data acquisition over that of the
OV1-10. Further improvement could have been realized if the magnetic
electron multipliers (MEMs) could have been replaced.
The S-056 suffered a problem within the first two weeks of
operation. High friction loads on the film drive mechanism caused a system
shutdown. By repeated sequencing, the crew was able to reactivate the
experiment. Subsequent aperture door problems also had to be faced. The
5-2
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Figure 5-1. Effectiveness of Maintenance versus Complexity
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influence of these actions, relative to the previous experiments, was to
place the 5-056 in a position to retrieve substantially more scientific
information than previously obtained. Without the crew action, it is
anticipated that the mission objectives would have been compromised
to the extent that the S-056 would have produced less usable data than
the OSO-7, but at a substantial increase in cost. The remaining ATM
experiments show similar trends as discussed in Volume II of this report.
Figure 5-1 clearly shows the marked improvement achieved
by manned maintenance and the potential for increasing effectiveness by
complete maintenance and repair. This would be the upper right hand
region of the figure, indicating a 100 percent effectiveness. This is the
region where future instruments should fall if they are to show improve-
ment over the 5-056. These results indicate that to reach this region will
raquire more extensive involvement of man in a repair role supporting a
d-sign that is space maintainable.
Active management of experiment operations by the crew
was also examined in a similar manner. Management considerations include
such parameters as: the ability to alter the sequence of operations, imple-
mentation of real time operations, and the potential to improve the quality
of the data obtained by virtue of man's presence. These results also indicate
that involvement of man in day-to-day operations substantially improves the
overall operational effectiveness. Since scientific investigation often relies
on being able to respond to unusual occurrences, these results can be inter-
preted as showing that a significant improvement in achieving mission objec-
tives can be realized with increased manned involvement.
The trends that result from examining this historical data
indicate that future instruments will inherently become more complex. As
such, it is important to recognize that proper involvement of man in mainte-
nance and management roles is a key factor to assure increased scientific
achievement commensurate with the increased cost of doing business.
5-4
6. APPLICATION TO FUTURE PROGRAMS
The assessment of past programs, such as the Skylab/ATM
experiments, provides valuable insight when considering future program
applications. This background has been employed in two ways: to establish
trends that show a value improvement with the introduction of inanned support,
and to assist in the definition of typical repair actions that would improve the
probability of achieving a high system availability.
6. 1	 APPLICATION OF VALUE ASSESSMENT
Results of this study show a marked improvement in opera-
tional effectiveness with increasing involvement of man. The Skylabe"A"TM
was the most advanced system to date in terms of manned utilization. Unfor-
tunately, most of the instruments were not designed for maintenance and
repair, and many of the operations were sufficiently automated so that only
monitoring was available. Even so, this resulted in a significant improve-
ment in performance over other unmanned instruments with remote monitor-
ing and control. However, the performance improvement must be evaluated
in light of the additional cost for the instrument. This becomes the basis of
a value assessment; performance divided by instrument cost.
The measure of performance selected for this assessment
is the amount of data obtained over the defined operational period. This is.
in effect, a measure of the availability of the instrument; a high availability
inherently results in a large quantity of data. Quantity of data can be
measured in several ways, such as, number of images obtained, but for
this case, it is defined as the estimated data bits obtained, as employed in
defining the maintenance factor M E . The quantity of data thus obtained is
divided by the cost of the instrument. Since this number is, in general,
quite large, it has been normalized to some extent by nondimensionalizing
and taking the logarithm to the base 10. A further adjustment is made to
account for the variation in quality of the data, recognizing that larger
instruments, although they may cost more, often provide improved resolution.
r
6-1
The resulting formula is given as:
Value Function = Q 	 log 10	 Q N
M
where
	 QL = Quality of data
QN =	 Quantity of data (Bits)
M	 =	 Cost of instrument (Dollars)
The cost of the OV1-10, OSO-7, and S-056 experiments
was estimated to be 1, 4, and 6 million dollars respectively. The estimated
value functions were then found to be 2, 6, and 15. Consequently, the rela-
tive return on investment shows a substantial improvement with increased
manned involvement despite the increased instrument cost.
The basic character of this trend is the po i nt of importance
lather than the computed values. It is estimated that in practice the scien-
,'fic value of data decreases somewhat exponentially after some period of
operation. That is to say that after some undefined point in time, more and
more of the acquired data becomes repetitious. There is, of course, always
the chance that some new phenomenon will develop hence, the desire to con-
tinue operation for as long a period as possible. Consequently, the quantity
of data employed for this assessment is not considered to be an absolute
parameter, but rather an indicator of the operational performance or avail-
ability of the instrument in question.
The following conclusions can be drawn from this assess-
ment. As the complexity of an instrument is increased, there will be an
associated cost increase, but the trend today is, with minimal manned
involvement, that this cost increase will provide a substantial improvement
in performance. Also, the point of man's involvement is very crucial. It
appears highly unlikely that a similar cost increase for an automated program
would generate a sufficient increase in performance to show a value improve-
ment over past efforts. In fact, if man (either remotely or directly) had not
been involved with the OSO-7 and the S-056, the results would have been of
6-2
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less value than the simplified OV1-10 experiment, although the costs were
substantially higher.
Finally, the ultimate in manned involvement will only be
achieved when man can function in space with the same degree of freedom
he realizes with terrestrial observatories. Many functions are necessarily
automated, but a small crew of men can maintain, operate, reprogram, and
analyze the observational programs to maximize scientific achievement.
This same concept must eventually evolve in space to maximize the scientific
achievement that can be realized in this environment. The trend toward
increased complexity is obvious. It is also obvious from historical com-
parisons that active manned participation is a necessity to achieve a level
of performance that justifies the increasing cost of scientific programs. The
next question arising is what level of maintenance should be programmed.
This is addressed in the next section.
6.2	 APPLICATION OF MAINTENANCE TRADEOFFS
The S-056 X-ray telescope is employed for the following
tradeoffs because it is representative of scientific instruments, unique in
its design concept as opposed to mature operational systems. A simplified
fault tree is developed to demonstrate failure paths that could lead to loss of
the instrument. The failures are considered sufficiently complete to form a
set of conditions representing the unreliability of the instrument. These
component failures are then ordered such that the benefit of repair action
can be assessed relative to the overall system availability.
A further tradeoff is performed to assess the value of com-
ponent redundancy as opposed to component repair. This tradeoff includes
the initial penalty associated with designing for repair operations, but also
takes advantage of the commonality of components. The results are limited
to the availability of reliability data, but are considered to be reasonably
representative of the trends that would be experienced with equipment simi-
lar to the S-056 X-ray telescope.
Figure 6-1 provides a sample of one of the fault trees
developed for the S-056. This is one of four trees that identify typical
6-3
vvHWy.bOVv^OOf/]vs.Oco^14
6-4
failures at the black box level. These component failures have then been
assigned a relative likelihood of occurrence factor (RLOO) that in effect
orders the components relative to the total composite of predicted failures.
Although this cannot incorporate all possible failures, (as with a compre-
hensive study) the sample :.s sufficiently large to be representative. This,
therefore, leads to the histogram shown in Figure 6-2.
This histogram can be integrated to derive the incremental
benefits of component repair relative to decreasing the unreliability of the
total system. In addition, the histogram can be arbitrarily varied to repre-
sent both optimistic and pessimistic distributions, thereby providing reason-
able bounds on the expected benefits of repair. The integrated effect is
shown in Figure 6-3. The reference distribution, which is considered most
realistic, shows a substantial improvement in availability even for low
values of repair. This catches the majority of weak items in the reliability
string. After this point (approximately 25%), the rate of return diminishes,
but is still sufficiently rewarding to be of value.
The shaded region of Figure 6-3 indicates the area of interest
for these types of instruments. The inherent nature of these designs will
probably preclude availabilities above 90 percent, but certainly with the cost
involved, a value above 70 percent is desirable. To reach this region with
the reference distribution requires access (and spares) for approximately
70 percent of the components in the sample. By examining the detail fault tree,
it will be noticed that there is a bz)od deal of commonality among the compo-
nents. Also, it should be recognized that with little modification, all are
accessible for repair. Consequently, a 70 percent repair capability does
not appear unrealistic.
If, however, a pessimistic distribution were assumed (a
high percentage of components have a high likelihood of occurrence), the
influence of repair is even more dramatic. This is to be expected, and
shows that conservatism can be employed in the reliability estimates with-
out decreasing the system availability, provided a repair compatibility
exists. Repair may never be required, but designing with thiF, in mind
6-5
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enhances the confidence that mission objectives can be achieved. If, on the
other hand, the components are assumed to be highly reliable, the value of
repair is diminished because any one component contributes only a small
portion to the total reliability. Experience indicates this is unrealistic, but
;t serves to define a region of interest relati-e to the influence of perform-
Ing repair operations.
The general character of the curves of Figure 6-3 shows the
importance of incorporating the option to perform repair operations. It
should further be pointed out that this figure only deals with currently identi-
:iable failure events. The Skylab results prove that many anomalies are not
predictable. They would not necessarily show up in a classical reliability
-analysis and they may not be obvious on a fault tree assessment. This is
all the more reason to provide the repair option. Designing the capability
to perform repair on known problem areas often will also provide access
,j repair unknown problems, or at least to develop effective work arounds.
This approach is found to be considerably more effective than judicious use
of redundancy as discussed next.
Redundancy is often employed as a means of increasing the
reliability of a system. This is particularly true for avionic subassemblies.
However, the reliability estimate for the S-056 shows the avionic subsystem
to be considerably more reliable than other components. Consequently, the
addition of a redundant set does not provide any substantial improvement in
system reliability. It is therefore important to optimize the addition of
redundant components relative to their incremental weight increase. The
associated reliability improvement is shown in Figure 6-4. This curve
shows that the knee of the curve occurs at an expected reliability of 55 per-
cent. Increasing redundancy beyond this point generates a severe weight
penalty. Scale factors have been employed, as shown in Figure 6-4, to
reflect the additional weight of brackets, connectors, etc. , that occur
when a redundant component is employed.
The same figure shows the influence of performing mainte-
nance, including the weight of spares provisioning. The initial weight
increase is associated with designing for maintenance, that is, a 7 percent
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penalty. After this, however, large increases in reliability can be achieved
with minor weight increases. This occurs because of the commonality of
components. A single spare component (stepper motors) may be employed
in one of several applications. The knee of this curve lies at 85 percent
reliability, considerably beyond what could be achieved by redundancy.
Although initially redundancy would be favored, the crossover occurs at
about 55 percent. This is not considered to be an acceptable level; hence,
repairability is the favored approach.
These results are sensitive to the equipment selected for
examination. It is anticipated that this general characteristic will be true
for all scientific instruments similar to the 5-056 X-ray telescope. If the
:_}.itial reliability were considerably higher, such as for COMSATs, the
characteristics could change substantially. Therefore, at least for scientific
instruments, the option to perform manned maintenance appears to be the
most efficient means of achieving mission objectives.
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The arguments for use of man are both subjective and
objective. The crew, without question, contributed significantly to the
success of the Skylab/ATM experiments. Even under unexpected, impro-
vised conditions, it was still possible to be effective. Had it been other-
wise, the scientific achievements would have been severely curtailed. Con-
templating these achievements leads to the consideration of what might have
been accomplished had the experiments been designed for repair action. It
also leads to consideration of what additional failures might have arisen
that would have reinforced the need for direct manned intervention. It is
a difficult question to answer because of so many uncertainties. This study
has attempted to rationalize and quantify some of those uncertainties to the
extent that man's contribution could be assessed versus alternative concepts.
The results of this effort show that orbital maintenance is
probably the most realistic means of achieving high system availabilities
for scientific instruments. A capability to maintain approximately 40 percent
of the more significant subassemblies and components is estimated to be a
lower bound. A 70 percent repair capability is preferred to assure achiev-
ing high availabilities. These levels of maintenance are found to have a
minimal impact on the instrument design, with an associated weight increase
of less than 7 percent.
This study has only touched on a small part of man's utility
in space. It hopes to join with other efforts to surface the benefits, limita-
tions, and possible hazards of such actions. Further work is needed, lead-
ing to test programs and flight operations to prove this utility. There are
bounds to man's activity for maintenance, at least in the near term. It is
unrealistic to expect him to assemble complex, intricate components requir-
ing special tooling and training. This will come eventually, but the present
need is to maintain the operational status of equipment to maximize its
value and to preclude having to repeat the experiment at a later tune. This
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presents a new challenge to the designer, but improved performance and
efficiency should be a sufficient incentive. The important point is to con-
tinue to keep the objective in mind and direct efforts toward it.
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